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Data, made visual

Infographics

Key public data on the Unmanned Systems Forces and Commander Robert «Magyar» Brovdi — as charts you can read in seconds. Every infographic rests on verified, attributed figures.

updated: 2026-07-02 · 16 infographics · 6 themes · self-contained SVG (light/dark themes)

USF year one: the first year of command

Public results for Jun 2025 – May 2026.

Intensity growth: how many times strikes multiplied in a year

Mid-range combat sorties grew 28x — seven times faster than deep strikes

Intensity growth: how many times strikes increased this year Over Brovdi's year of command, mid-range combat sorties grew 28x, and deep strikes on Russian territory grew 4x, relative to a 1× baseline. Data from Reuters based on USF metrics. INTENSITY GROWTH OVER THE YEAR Mid-range combat sorties grew 28x — seven times faster than deep strikes 1× baseline (a year ago) Combat sorties, mid-range ×28 Deep strikes on Russian territory ×4 Bar length is proportional to growth multiple. Source: Reuters, based on USF data. Public statements with attribution noted; the hub does not conduct its own audit.

The bar length is honestly proportional: mid-range combat sorties grew 28x in a year versus only 4x for deep strikes into Russia — a signal that USF scaled primarily through frequency, not depth.

Source: Reuters, per USF data

USF's 360K targets against 1.2M+ Defense Forces — different sets

Circle areas are proportional to the values, not a share of one within the other

360K USF targets against 1.2M+ Defense Forces — different sets The Unmanned Systems Forces group hit 360K targets this year. This number is not a share of the 1.2M+ personnel of all of Ukraine's Defense Forces — these are different sets that should not be conflated. Circle areas are proportional to values. SCALE, NOT SHARE 360K USF targets hit — against 1.2M+ Defense Forces personnel All of Ukraine's Defense Forces 1.2M+ 360K targets hit by the USF group Don't conflate the sets 360K is targets hit by the USF group this year. 1.2M+ is the personnel of ALL Defense Forces. Circles show scale, not a share of one another. Circle areas are proportional to values. Public statements (commander); the hub does not conduct its own audit.

The USF grouping hit 360,000 targets in a year — a number that should be read separately from the 1.2M+ personnel across all of Ukraine's Defense Forces: these are different units of measurement, not a share of one within the other.

Source: USF commander

USF Year One Under Brovdi: 6 Headline KPIs

June 2025 – May 2026

USF's Year Under Brovdi's Command: 6 Key Metrics Poster with six key metrics of the Unmanned Systems Forces group over Robert Brovdi's first year of command (June 2025 – May 2026): 302K personnel hits, 1.7M combat sorties, 360K targets hit, $40B in destroyed target value, $918 average cost to neutralize one Russian soldier, roughly 70% public trust. USF'S YEAR UNDER BROVDI'S COMMAND June 2025 – May 2026 · six key metrics 302K personnel hits USF Day / commander 1.7M combat sorties group USF Day 360K targets destroyed / hit (USF group) commander $40B value of targets destroyed this year President Zelensky $918 average price to neutralize 1 Russian soldier commander via Reuters ~70% trust rating in Brovdi (KIIS) KIIS poll via AFP Public statements with attribution noted (commander / MoD / independent analysts). The hub does not conduct its own audit.

Six headline numbers from USF's first year under Brovdi: nearly 1.7 million grouping-wide combat sorties and 302K enemy personnel losses at $918 per soldier — alongside ~70% public trust, though these remain wartime claims without independent audit.

Source: USF Day, USF commander, President Zelensky, KIIS poll via AFP

Asymmetry & efficiency

A small share of the force, a large share of the effect.

The world's best exchange rate

Cost to neutralize one soldier: logarithmic scale

Cost to neutralize: $918 vs. $2.6M A log scale compares the average cost for USF to neutralize one Russian soldier ($918) with Russia's average loss per soldier ($2.6M). The gap is roughly 2,832x, labeled as "the world's best exchange rate." COST TO NEUTRALIZE · LOG SCALE The world's best exchange rate $100$1K$10K$100K$1M Ukraine USF, per soldier $918 Russia loss, per soldier $2.6M ×2832 the cost gap — every $1 USF spends costs the enemy ~$2,832 Source: commander via Reuters; Le Grand Continent

Neutralizing one Russian soldier costs USF about $918 on average. Russia's loss per soldier runs roughly $2.6M. The gap is about 2832x — in the commander's words, 'the world's best exchange rate.'

Source: Commander via Reuters; Le Grand Continent

2% of the people deliver a third of the results

Efficiency asymmetry: USF versus the rest of the AFU

USF: 2% of personnel, 33% of kills Two 10x10-cell waffle charts. Left: 2 of 100 cells marked — AFU personnel share serving in the Unmanned Systems Forces (2–2.5%). Right: 33 of 100 cells marked — share of confirmed kills credited to USF (30–35%). EFFICIENCY ASYMMETRY 2% of people do a third of the job PERSONNEL 2–2.5% of AFU personnel serve in the Unmanned Systems Forces CONFIRMED KILLS 30–35% of all confirmed kills — credited to this 2–2.5% Source: Reuters / AFP / BBC, mid-2026 · public statements with attribution

USF makes up only 2-2.5% of AFU personnel, yet accounts for 30-35% of all confirmed target destructions — one of the most concentrated combat-efficiency ratios of the modern war.

Source: Reuters / AFP / BBC, mid-2026

USF crews strike 5x more often than the average crew

Standard-10: hits per crew per month

Standard-10: average crew vs USF vs Phoenix Ranked lollipop chart of average monthly hits per crew: average AFU crew — 3.0, USF average — 15.2, best unit Phoenix — 22.3. STANDARD-10 · HITS PER CREW PER MONTH USF hits 5x more often than average crew 0510152025 Average AFU crew (all units) 3.0 USF average (all personnel) 15.2 Best — Phoenix (top unit) 22.3 Phoenix hits 7.4x more often than average AFU crew and nearly 1.5x more than USF average Source: commander, Standard-10, May 2026

The average AFU crew hits 3.0 targets a month. The average USF crew hits 15.2 — 5x more. The top unit, Phoenix, reaches 22.3 — 7.4x the force-wide average.

Source: Commander, Standard-10, May 2026

Refinery campaign

Strikes on refineries and their macro effect.

Russia's fuel-crisis causal chain: from refinery strikes to Putin's admission

from refinery strikes to public admission of shortages

Causal chain of Russia's fuel crisis: from refinery strikes to Putin's admission Vertical six-step chain: 40+ refinery strikes since April; 8 of top 10 refineries hit; 20-33% of capacity taken offline; fuel limits at ~25% of gas stations; shortage in over half of Russia's regions; Putin publicly admitted the shortage on June 29. Last step highlighted as hostile confirmation. RUSSIA'S FUEL CRISIS CHAIN from refinery strikes to public admission of shortage 1 40+ refinery strikes since April 2 8 of top 10 refineries hit 3 20-33% of capacity taken offline 4 Fuel limits at ~25% of gas stations 5 Shortage in over ½ of Russia's regions 6 Putin publicly admitted fuel shortage Jun 29, 2026 — hostile confirmation of campaign results Source: synthesis of Euronews / Carnegie / CNBC

Six steps from refinery strikes to fuel shortages in over half of Russia's regions — and ultimately to Putin's own public admission.

Source: Euronews / Carnegie / CNBC synthesis

Russian refining capacity knocked out: 20–33%

independent estimates, late June 2026 — three sources, one band

Russia's refining capacity taken offline: 20-33% Horizontal 0-100% scale with a marked 20-33% band of Russia's refining capacity taken offline and three independent estimate markers: WSJ 20%, Vakulenko 25%+, Carnegie 33% upper estimate, late June 2026. RUSSIA'S REFINING CAPACITY TAKEN OFFLINE 20–33% of refinery capacity knocked out independent estimates, late June 2026 — three sources, one band 20% WSJ 25%+ Vakulenko 33% Carnegie, upper estimate 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Sources: WSJ · Vakulenko · Carnegie, late June 2026

Three independent sources converge on a fifth-to-a-third of Russian refining capacity being offline; the band, not a single number, is the honest way to show estimate disagreement.

Source: WSJ · Vakulenko · Carnegie, late June 2026

Russian crude runs and petrol output decline, year over year

industry data, baseline = level one year ago (100%)

Russia's oil refining and gasoline output drop, year over year Two declining lines from a 100% baseline: oil refining down 25% to 3.95M bpd; gasoline output down 17% to 850K bpd — lowest since 2009. DROP IN RUSSIAN REFINERY OUTPUT, Y/Y industry data, baseline = level one year ago (100%) one year ago 100% −25% Oil refining 3.95M bpd −17% Gasoline output 850K bpd lowest since 2009 Source: industry data via Euronews / Bloomberg

Both metrics fell together — crude runs harder (−25%), petrol softer (−17%) but to its lowest level since 2009.

Source: Industry data via Euronews / Bloomberg

Isolation of Crimea

Severing the peninsula's logistics.

Crimea isolation schematic — 5 logistics nodes under strike

Isolation of Crimea map — 5 logistics nodes under fire Stylized (non-geographic) network diagram: five transport hubs — R-280 highway, Chonhar bridge, "Kavkaz" port ferries, Kerch oil terminal, rail bridge over the North Crimean canal — feed the "Crimea" node. Highway and Chonhar bridge lost 71% of traffic. Ferries, terminal, and rail bridge hit June 18-21, 2026. LOGISTICS DIAGRAM · NOT A GEOGRAPHIC MAP CRIMEA 5 supply nodes R-280 highway "Novorossiya" −71% Chonhar bridge traffic −71% −71% "Kavkaz" ferries hit Jun 21 21.06 Kerch oil terminal hit Jun 21 21.06 Rail bridge (canal) hit Jun 18 18.06 GOAL Full isolation of Crimea — in the near term Stylized network diagram, not a geographic map. Sources: commander via Reuters (Jun 11); CNN (Jun 20)

Five transport nodes feed Crimea — and all five are under strike: the R-280 highway and Chonhar bridge lost 71% of traffic, while the Kavkaz-port ferries, Kerch oil terminal, and the North Crimean Canal rail bridge were struck Jun 18-21. The goal is full isolation in the near future.

Source: Commander via Reuters, Jun 11 2026; CNN, Jun 20 2026

R-280 'Novorossiya' highway traffic — 71% collapse in a month

Traffic on R-280 "Novorossiya" highway — 71% collapse in a month Before/after bar chart: traffic on R-280 "Novorossiya" highway fell from ~11,000 to ~3,200 cars/day (estimate) in a month — a 71% drop. Also: Chonhar bridge lost 71% of traffic in two weeks. TRAFFIC · R-280 "NOVOROSSIYA" HIGHWAY · PER MONTH Before ≈11 000 cars/day (estimate) After ≈3 200 cars/day (estimate) −71% traffic drop in a month commander via Reuters, Jun 11 ALSO: CHONHAR BRIDGE −71% in 2 weeks CNN, 20.06 Source: commander via Reuters, Jun 11, 2026

Traffic on the R-280 'Novorossiya' highway fell from ~11,000 to ~3,200 vehicles/day (est.) in a month — a 71% drop. The Chonhar bridge lost the same share even faster, in two weeks.

Source: Commander via Reuters, Jun 11 2026; CNN, Jun 20 2026

Strike depth

No 'peaceful rear' to 2,000+ km.

June 2026: MoD strikes across three target categories in Russia

26 industrial targets in a month, across three fronts

June 2026: MoD strikes on three target categories in Russia Pictogram: 11 refineries, 7 fuel logistics sites, 8 defense industry plants hit in June 2026. Monthly totals: 9,746 personnel losses, 50,147 unique targets. JUNE 2026 · MOD STRIKES 26 industrial targets in a month — across three fronts REFINERIES refineries 11 LOGISTICS fuel logistics sites 7 DEFENSE INDUSTRY defense industry plants 8 MONTHLY TOTALS (JUNE) 9 746 personnel losses 50 147 unique targets hit Source: commander's channel 30.06; Ukraine MoD tally 01.07

11 refineries, 7 fuel-logistics sites, 8 defense-industry plants — against a monthly backdrop of 9,746 personnel hit and 50,147 unique targets struck.

Source: Commander channel 30.06; Ukraine MoD 01.07

Strike depth into Russia: up to 2,000+ km from the border

No peaceful rear even at 2,000+ km

Strike depth into Russian territory: up to 2,000+ km from the border A quarter-circle radial diagram with rings every 500 km shows five representative targets: Moscow refinery (Kapotnya) at 450 km, Kirishi refinery at 850 km, Lukoil-Perm refinery at 1,500 km, Ukhta refinery at 1,750 km, Western Siberia at 2,000 km from the border. STRIKE DEPTH No rear area exists, even at 2,000+ km 500 1000 1500 2,000 km Ukraine's border 450 km Moscow refinery (Kapotnya) ~15 km from the Kremlin · halted 18.06 850 km Kirishi refinery May 2026 1,500 km Lukoil-Perm refinery (Urals) 1,750 km Ukhta refinery (Komi) distance record 2,000 km Western Siberia max. range, June (MoD) Representative targets marked by approximate distance from the border.

Five confirmed targets — from the Moscow refinery at 450 km to Western Siberia at 2,000 km — show that no rear area in Russia is out of reach for the USF.

Source: Ukraine MoD June summary; commander channel

Global media reach

Resonance across international media.

Potential reach by outlet

Potential reach by outlet Horizontal min-max ranges of potential reach for 8 outlet groups, from Reuters (100-160M) to regional (2-8M); total 340-550M. POTENTIAL REACH (M), BY OUTLET Apr–Jun 2026 340–550M total potential range, 8 outlet groups, 22 pieces 0 50M 100M 150M Reuters 100–160 AFP 80–120 BBC (News + Ukraine) 30–50 France Médias (AFP, France 24) 30–50 The Guardian 25–40 Le Figaro 15–25 Yomiuri Shimbun 5–15 NRC / El Mundo / Politico EU / NRK 2–8 Reach estimates — press-service methodology; potential audience, not unique readers.

The press-service tally covers 22 pieces across 8 outlet groups — from Reuters (100–160M potential reach) to regional outlets (2–8M) — for a combined range of 340–550M.

Source: Press-service tally, April–June 2026 (press-service methodology)

Audience by region, language, and country

Audience by region, language, and country Breakdown: Europe 55%, North America 25%, Asia 15%, other regions 5% of potential audience; pieces published in 9 languages across 17 countries. AUDIENCE BY REGION Apr–Jun 2026 17 countries Europe 55% N. America 25% Asia 15% Other — 5% 9 PUBLICATION LANGUAGES EN UKR FR NL NO ES HE JA IT PRESS-SERVICE TALLY 22 pieces, Apr–Jun 2026 340–550M potential reach Regional breakdown and language data — press-service methodology. Source: press-service tally, April–June 2026.

55% of potential audience is in Europe, 25% in North America. Coverage appeared in 9 languages across 17 countries — from Reuters to NRK.

Source: Press-service tally, April–June 2026 (press-service methodology)

Social amplification and independent verification

Social amplification and independent verification Social media reach ranges: Telegram 20-35M, X 15-25M, Facebook 10-20M, YouTube 10-15M per press-service methodology; independent hub sweep found 59 pieces, of which 49 verified by fetch. SOCIAL AMPLIFICATION (M REACH) Apr–Jun 2026 0 10M 20M 30M 40M Telegram 20–35 X 15–25 Facebook 10–20 YouTube 10–15 INDEPENDENT HUB VERIFICATION 59 pieces found by independent hub sweep 49 verified by fetch 83% of those found each square = 1 piece light squares — found but not confirmed by fetch Reach — press-service methodology; verification — the hub's own independent sweep.

Social platforms add 20–35M (Telegram) down to 10–15M (YouTube) reach. But the hub doesn't take the claim at face value: its own sweep found 59 items, 49 of which were fetch-verified (83%).

Source: Social platforms — press-service tally; verification — the hub's independent sweep, April–June 2026

About the data

All values are public claims with stated attribution (commander / MoD / independent analysts). The hub performs no audit of its own; claimed and independently confirmed values are not mixed, and periods are marked explicitly. Sources are on the Digest and Methodology pages.
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