Key public data about the Unmanned Systems Forces and Commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi — in charts that can be read in seconds. Each infographic relies on verified figures with attribution.
Public results for 06.2025–05.2026.
Medium-range combat sorties grew 28-fold — seven times faster than deep strikes
Bar proportionally longer: over the year medium-range combat sorties grew 28-fold versus only 4-fold for deep strikes on Russia — a signal that USF scaling happened primarily through frequency, not depth.
Source: Reuters, from USF data
Circle areas proportional to values, not share of one from the other
USF grouping struck 360 thousand targets over the year — a number to be read separately from the 1.2+ million personnel of all Defense Forces of Ukraine: these are different units of measurement, not a share of one from the other.
Source: USF Commander
June 2025 – May 2026
Six summary figures of the first year of USF under Brovdi's command: nearly 1.7 million combat sorties of the grouping and 302 thousand RF personnel strikes by drones of all Defense Forces (entire army, including USF — not just USF) at $918 per soldier — and ~70% public trust despite these being wartime claims without independent audit.
Source: USF Day, USF commander, President Zelenskyy, KMIS survey via AFP
Small fraction of forces — large fraction of result.
Cost of neutralizing one soldier: logarithmic scale
Neutralizing one RF soldier costs USF an average of $918. Russia loses approximately $2.6 million on one soldier. The differential is about 2,832 times, in the Commander's words — "the best exchange rate in the world".
Source: Commander via Reuters; Le Grand Continent
Asymmetry of effectiveness: USF versus the rest of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
USF is only 2–2.5% of Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel, but this unit accounts for 30–35% of all confirmed target eliminations. One of the most concentrated combat effectiveness rates in modern warfare.
Source: Reuters / AFP / BBC, mid-2026
Standard-10: strikes per crew per month
Average Armed Forces of Ukraine crew strikes 3.0 targets per month. Average USF crew — 15.2, 5 times more. The best unit — 414th Brigade "Madyar's Birds" — reaches 32 strikes per strike crew per month, almost 11 times more than average Armed Forces of Ukraine crew.
Source: Commander / USF media service, Standard-10 (brigade clarification, 2026)
Strikes on refineries and their macro effect.
from refinery strikes to public admission of shortage
Six steps from refinery strikes to fuel shortage in over half of Russia's regions — and ultimately to public admission by Putin himself.
Source: Euronews / Carnegie / CNBC synthesis
independent estimates, end of June 2026 — three sources, one band
Three independent sources converge on one-fifth to one-third of Russia's refining capacity taken out of operation; a band, not a single figure, is an honest way to show disagreement of estimates.
Source: WSJ · Vakulenko · Carnegie, end of June 2026
industrial data, base = level year ago (100%)
Both indicators fell simultaneously — oil refining harder (−25%), gasoline weaker (−17%), but to the lowest level since 2009.
Source: Industrial data via Euronews / Bloomberg
Cutting peninsula logistics. As of end of July 2026: 164 struck energy facilities feeding Crimea (44 at the start of the month); Kerch Ferry capacity reduced by 75% (jointly with SBU); maritime phase — operation "MoLoCHKa" (see separate page).
Five transport hubs feed Crimea — and all five under strike: R-280 highway and Chonhar bridge lost 71% of traffic, "Kavkaz" ferries, Kerch oil terminal, and railway bridge across North Crimean Canal struck 18–21 June. Goal — complete isolation in the near future.
Source: Commander via Reuters, 11.06.2026; CNN, 20.06.2026
Traffic on the R-280 "Novorossiya" highway dropped from ~11,000 to ~3,200 vehicles/day (estimate) per month — a 71% decline. The Chonhar Bridge lost the same amount of traffic even faster — in two weeks.
Source: Commander via Reuters, 11.06.2026; CNN, 20.06.2026
No "peaceful rear" up to 2,000+ km.
26 industrial targets per month — across three fronts
11 refineries, 7 fuel logistics facilities, 8 MIC enterprises — and against this backdrop 9,746 personnel strikes and 50,147 unique targets per month.
Source: Commander's channel 30.06; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine 01.07
No rear exists even beyond 2,000+ km
Five confirmed targets—from Moscow Refinery at 450 km to Western Siberia at 2000 km—show that for the USF there is no safe rear deep inside russia.
Source: Ukraine MoD summary (June); Commander's channel
Official verified hits by month since 11 Jun 2025 (USF Grouping). Source: sbs-group.army.
Claimed by USF — official tally from Commander Robert Brovdi, 07 Jul – 01 Aug 2026.
Of 65 "naval"-type strike-map records, 13 are pure running-total claims with no type breakdown (excluded from the chart); the rest resolve into 152 vessel-type entries.
Sources: t.me/robert_magyar (cumulative claims, Jul–Aug 2026) · LB.ua · Kyiv Independent · Euromaidan Press · Glavcom, 01.08 · USF strike map (strikes.json)
Claimed by USF — strikes on Wildberries logistics hubs in the russian rear, July 2026.
13 of 2,613 targets in the by-category breakdown — 0.5%. That matches the order of magnitude of the "withheld" strategic-depth figure (see "Strike depth" below) — but the two are different official cuts of the data, not the same count.
Sources: t.me/robert_magyar/2676, /2684 · research/factpacks/july/press-service-final.md §2, §5
Distribution of 53,755 targets hit, by distance from the line of contact (tactical average: 3.73 km from the LBZ); claimed by USF.
Tactical and operational are exact claimed figures (51,147 and 2,415). Strategic — the source states only "~0.5%" and withholds the count; the computed remainder from 53,755 is 193 (0.36%), not 269 — the source’s own rounding does not quite reconcile with its absolute figures.
Sources: t.me/robert_magyar/2684 · glavcom.ua / ukrinform.ua, 01–02.08.2026 · press-service-final.md §2